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The role of national parliaments in EU matters has become an important subject in the debate 
over the democratic legitimacy of European Union (EU) decision-making. Strengthening 
parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights both at the domestic and at the European level 
is often seen as an effective measure to address the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU – 
the reason for affording them a prominent place in the newly introduced ‘Provisions on 
Democratic Principles’ of the Union (in particular Art.12 TEU). Whether this aim can be met, 
however, depends crucially on the degree and the manner in which national parliaments 
actually make use of their institutional rights. This volume therefore aims at providing a 
comprehensive overview of the activities of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon era. This 
includes the ‘classic’ scrutiny of EU legislation, but also parliamentary involvement in EU 
foreign policy, the use of new parliamentary participations rights of the Lisbon Treaty (Early 
Warning System), their role regarding the EU’s response to the eurozone crisis and the, so far 
under-researched, role of parliamentary administrators in scrutiny processes. In this 
introduction, we provide the guiding theoretical framework for the contributions. Based on 
neo-institutionalist approaches, we discuss institutional capacities and political motivation as 
the two key explanatory factors in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
 








‘Maybe not formally speaking, but at least politically speaking, all national parliaments have 
become, in a way, European institutions’ (Van Rompuy 2012). Whether it is indeed true - or 
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even desirable - that national parliaments have become ‘European institutions’ in a more 
narrow sense, is open to debate (Cygan 2013: 21). Yet the statement certainly suggests that 
the former ‘losers’ of the European integration process have come a long way. For a long 
time the role of national parliaments was not formally recognised at the European level, and 
in the domestic arena the integration process provided ample opportunities for the executive 
actors to bypass legislatures and strengthen their hold on policy-making. Concerns about a 
growing democratic deficit were addressed through repeated and substantial expansions of 
the powers of the European Parliament, whereas national parliaments remained on the 
margins. 
However, over time the ‘victims’ of integration have learned ‘to fight back’ and obtained new 
opportunities for participation in domestic European policy-making. It was a slow and 
uneven process through which in they improved their institutional position, but they gained 
increased rights to scrutinise European affairs and to control the way in which ministers and 
officials represented national interests in Brussels. Today, the Lisbon Treaty not only 
mentions the role of national parliaments explicitly (article 12 TEU), but it also gives them a 
role within the EU’s legislative process, in particular as the new guardians of the subsidiarity 
principle.  
The academic literature on national parliaments in the EU has mirrored these changes quite 
closely.1 During the early years of integration, few publications dealt with its impact on 
national parliaments, but the last two decades have seen them emerge as one of the most 
salient issues in the debates on the democratic quality of EU governance. Yet the story of 
national parliaments in the EU is not only one of success: The coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty coincided with one of the greatest challenges national parliaments have yet had 
to face, the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, which has raised renewed concerns about 
parliamentary legitimacy in the EU (Fox 2012, Pollak 2014, Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 
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2013). And despite their stronger institutional position in EU affairs, the debate as to whether 
national parliaments can and do actually play an effective role in European policy-making 
continues.  
This volume seeks to contribute to this debate by presenting the findings of an international 
research project addressing these questions. It aims at providing a comprehensive overview 
of the activities of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon era across a range of different 
policy-areas and decision-modes, and thus sheds some light on a topic that is widely 
discussed, but on which only limited comparative empirical knowledge exists.  
In the current debate, different and indeed opposing views of the role of national parliaments 
persist. As Pollak has argued, ‘[w]ithin the EU’s political system the assessment of the role of 
national parliaments oscillates between hope and frustration’ (Pollak 2014: 25). On the one 
hand, their expanded participation rights give reason to assume that national parliaments have 
the potential not only to be attentive domestic watchdogs regarding their governments’ 
actions ‘in Brussels’, but that they also have a capacity to develop into more autonomous 
players – either individually or jointly – at the EU level. For some, the involvement of 
national parliaments even seems to go to far already: In early 2012, then Italian prime 
minister and former EU commissioner Mario Monti (2012) argued that national parliaments, 
especially those ‘to the north of Germany’ were something of a spanner thrown into the 
system: ‘If governments let themselves be fully bound by the decisions of their parliaments 
without protecting their own freedom to act, a breakup of Europe would be a more probable 
outcome than deeper integration’. While Monti later qualified his statement following severe 
criticism, it does reveal an attitude that considers a powerful involvement of national 
parliaments in EU policy-making, and especially in times of economic crisis, as something of 
a hindrance. On the other hand, authors have consistently, and especially in the context of the 
eurozone crisis, pointed out the challenges national parliaments face in actually making use 
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of their participation rights, such as the highly technical character and complexity of EU 
issues, the lack of transparency of EU negotiations, the lack of time and resources required to 
process information on EU policies adequately or, in particular, the lack of incentives to get 
involved.  
The main reason for such disagreements on the role of national parliaments is arguably the 
lack of empirical data on parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs. The strengthening of 
parliamentary scrutiny and participation rights both at the domestic and at the European level 
is often seen as an effective measure to address the perceived democratic deficit in EU 
decision-making – the reason for affording them a prominent place in the newly introduced 
‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’ of the Union (in particular Art.12 TEU). However, 
whether these aims can be met depends crucially on whether and how national parliaments 
actually do get involved in EU affairs.  
Referring to Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg address, Lindseth (2012) has argued that the EU 
has come a long way in terms of ‘government by and for the people’, i.e. in terms of input 
and output legitimacy. However, he argues, ‘government of the people’ requires identification 
with a polity and a sense of ownership, in other words, a ‘political cultural perception that the 
institutions of government are genuinely the people’s own’ (ibid.: 6). National parliaments 
can only provide this sense of ownership for their citizens in EU affairs, if they do fulfil their 
parliamentary functions in EU politics. This includes not only scrutinising EU policies and 
controlling the government as an expression of their legislative, or more adequately, policy-
influencing function, but also - and fundamentally – communicating EU politics and holding 
the government publicly to account (Auel 2007). Unless they actually fulfil these functions, 
national parliaments will contribute little to the democratic legitimacy of EU policy-making.  
The aim of this volume, arising from the research conducted by the Observatory of 
Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty (OPAL), is therefore to provide comprehensive and 
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comparative empirical data on the way in which national parliaments make use of their 
powers and intervene in EU affairs2. By investigating parliamentary EU activities in practice, 
it aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions under which national 
parliaments can indeed provide the added value in terms of democratic legitimacy in EU 
policy-making. In this endeavour it goes beyond the classic focus on the formal powers of 
parliamentary scrutiny by presenting insights into the actual practice of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs within the domestic arena. This includes the ‘classic’ scrutiny of 
EU legislation, but also parliamentary involvement in non-legislative areas such as EU 
foreign policy making, the use of new parliamentary participations rights of the Lisbon 
Treaty (Early Warning System) and their role regarding the EU’s response to the sovereign 
debt crisis in the eurozone. In addition, contributors analyse the so far under-researched role 
of parliamentary administrators in scrutiny processes.  
While the contributions investigate different aspects of parliamentary involvement in EU 
affairs using different types of data, they were guided by a common analytical frame that 
provided the theoretical lens for the empirical research. In the following, we outline this 
theoretical framework that draws on the insights of the neo-institutionalist turn in the social 
sciences. It starts with the recognition that research on national parliaments in the EU needs 
to be sensitive to both the relevance of formal arrangements and to the way in which actors 
actually make use of these. Accordingly, the contributors to this volume operate on the 
assumption that, on the one hand, formal rights, legal rules and existing norms – in other 
words the institutional capacities of parliaments - provide certain opportunities for 
parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, but, on the other hand, that these do not determine – 
and thus cannot be equated with – the actual behaviour of parliaments. Therefore, to explain 
the nature, direction and intensity of parliamentary involvement, the motivation of individual 
members of parliament (MP) and parliamentary party groups (PPG) to become involved 
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needs to be studied, and the preferences, incentives and driving forces that guide their actions 
ought to be examined. Accordingly, we identify institutional capacity and actors’ motivation 
as the two key explanatory factors in the analysis of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
The following section elaborates in more detail how these factors have been derived and how 
they have been applied in the context of the empirical research presented in this volume.  
 
Parliamentary Activity in the EU: A Neo-Institutionalist Perspective  
Following the well-known argument by March and Olsen, we can distinguish between two 
logics of human behaviour, a ‘logic of consequentiality’ and a ‘logic of appropriateness’ – a 
basic assumption that can also be applied to the present context of parliamentary activity in 
the EU. According to the former, actors’ behaviour is based on considerations of the 
consequences of their action in terms of furthering (their own) preferences and thus rooted in 
rationality and efficiency, while the latter is based on considerations of the consistency of 
their actions with cultural and political norms and rules (March and Olsen 1995: 154). 
These two logics of behaviour have given rise to different approaches within a broader neo-
institutionalist turn that recognises that institutions are not neutral containers fulfilling certain 
functional needs, but interact with, and are subject to, the behaviour of individuals working 
with and through them. As Fenno has argued (2000: 6), ‘representatives are context 
interpreters. And they will make choices and take actions not in the abstract, but accordingly 
to what they believe to be rational and/or appropriate in the circumstances or context in 
which they find themselves’. While neo-institutionalist approaches share the common 
perspective that behaviour can be explained with both institutional context and actors’ 
preferences or motivations, they differ greatly in their conception of both, institutions and the 
origin or formation of preferences. As a result, they also develop very different hypotheses on 
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the way actors interpret the context they find themselves in and emphasise different 
explanations for the logic of action, the interpretation of rules, and thus for the motivations 
and incentives driving behaviour.  
The logic of consequentiality is most strongly emphasised by Rational Choice approaches 
that view actors as rational utility maximisers who have fixed, exogenous preferences. Here, 
institutions ‘merely’ act as constraints on or provide opportunities for specific behaviour and 
strategies to pursue the realisation of these preferences. With this emphasis on individual 
preferences and incentives rather than group norms and processes of socialisation, actors are 
conceptualised as fairly independent of their context: ‘Rational choice institutionalism 
consequently sees institutions as providing a context within which individual decisions are 
set, but places the emphasis on ‘individual’ rather than ‘context’ (Aspinwall and Schneider 
2000: 11). As will be discussed in more detail below, rational choice institutionalist 
approaches hypothesise that MPs are mainly motivated by their interest in maximising their 
chances for re-election, career development and/or policy influence. 
From the perspective of a ‘logic of appropriateness’, emphasised by normative or 
sociological neo-institutionalist approaches, in contrast, preferences are neither stable, nor 
precise, nor exogenous (March and Olsen 1989: 163). Moreover, institutions ‘do not just 
constrain options; they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 11). Actors and their context are thus rather closely liked. From 
this perspective, institutions not only impact preferences but also define what is deemed 
appropriate behaviour in a given situation. The main hypothesis that can be derived from this 
perspective is that parliamentary behaviour will be guided by a logic of appropriateness, by 
formal and informal rules of and norms for parliamentary behaviour and – more generally – 
by parliamentary culture.  
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Historical institutionalism emphasises especially the (possibly unintended) consequences of 
institutional choices and their long-term impact in terms of path dependency. While mainly 
concerned with long-term institutional or policy development, the approach can also be 
applied to the study of parliamentary behaviour, both form a more rationalist and a more 
sociological perspective. Institutions are conceptualised as ‘sets of regularized practices with 
a rule-like quality in the sense that the actors expect the practices to be observed; and which, 
in some but not all, cases are supported by formal sanctions’ (Hall and Thelen 2009, p. 3). As 
a result, actors’ strategies and goals become entrenched and thus path-dependent over time as 
well and relatively resistant to change even under new circumstances. 
This distinction between the two logics of actions, and the resultant development of different 
strands of institutional analysis, is a valuable starting point to approach the study of 
parliamentary activity in the EU. The contributions to this volume broadly follow the insights 
of such an approach by investigating both, institutional capacities defined by legal and 
institutional norms as well as the incentives driving individual and collective actors within 
parliaments, to explain parliamentary behaviour. In the following we develop each of these 
two broad sets of – complementary rather than competing - explanatory factors further and 
illustrate the ways in which they can be used towards a more comprehensive empirical 




Institutional Capacity: institutional opportunities and constraints 
As discussed in the previous section, what distinguishes historical institutionalist approaches 
is their emphasis on the long term – historical – development and resulting resilience and 
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durability of institutions (Pierson 2004). Thus, whether behaviour is assumed to be guided by 
exogenous rational preferences or by beliefs and norms, cultural traditions and individual role 
conceptions, the general expectation is that it will be rather resistant to change. Institutional 
or behavioural repertoires are assumed to act as a barrier to change because actors faced with 
new situations or challenges will draw on pre-existing institutions or patterns of behaviour 
rather than considering new ones. As such, the historical institutionalist approach is sensitive 
not only to new opportunities provided by the institutional framework, but also to the 
constraints it imposes on actors.  
In his analysis of the adaptation of the French, Greek and British parliament to EU 
integration, Dimitrakopoulos’ (2001), for example, shows how change ‘has proceeded by 
means of small, marginal steps based on existing institutional repertoires in a manner that has 
reproduced the historically defined weaknesses of these Parliaments’ (419- 420). As a result, 
not only will new institutional provisions reflect given institutional paths, but parliamentary 
behaviour in EU affairs is also expected to follow the main patterns developed in domestic 
affairs. As Damgaard and Jensen (2005) show for the Danish Folketing, existing executive–
legislative relationships and the modes of decision-making in national politics are indeed 
replicated in the European context: ‘the general patterns of parliamentary decision-making 
also characterise the field of EU policy. It appears that well-known national policy-making 
styles are used, with some adjustments, to take care of problems associated with EU policy-
making (Ibid.: 409).  
With respect to the institutional capacity as an explanatory factor, it is necessary to take these 
insights about the significance of institutional path dependency on board when studying the 
context within which parliaments participate in EU affairs. This requires, in addition, a two-
fold approach, namely a distinction between the institutional environment present at the EU 
level as well as at the domestic level. At both levels, a mix between pre-existing and newly 
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changed conditions has had an impact on the opportunities and constrains of national 
parliaments.  
 
The European Institutional Context  
As noted above, in the earlier phase of European integration, the position for national 
parliaments in the EU in terms of institutional powers had been weak, but over time, and 
especially with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, institutional provisions were 
expanded in a number of ways, both directly and indirectly. Regarding the former, the new 
‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union’ mainly provides 
national parliaments with better access to information about the European decision-making 
process. They not only receive a broad range of documents, including non-legislative 
documents such as the annual reports of the Court of Auditors or the Commission’s annual 
legislative programme, but they also receive these documents directly (rather than via their 
governments as under the Treaty of Amsterdam).  
Second, the ‘Protocol on The Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality’ provides national parliaments (both chambers in bicameral systems) with a 
more direct role on the EU legislative process through the so-called Early Warning 
Mechanism (Kiiver 2012). They have the right to submit - within eight weeks of receiving a 
legislative proposal - a ‘reasoned opinion’ to the Commission if they find the proposal to 
violate the subsidiarity principle (Article 7.1). If one third of the national parliaments submit 
a reasoned opinion, the Commission must formally review the proposal and may withdraw or 
amend it but also maintain it unaltered (Article 7.2). Thus, in these cases national parliaments 
can only show the Commission the ‘yellow card’, but not force it to take their concerns into 
account. If, however, at least half of the national parliaments submit reasoned opinions on a 
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legislative proposal falling under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), and the 
Commission maintains the proposal, the legislative proposal will be submitted to both the 
Council and the European Parliament for review (‘orange card’). While national parliaments 
thus still do not have a right to force the Commission directly to take their opinion into 
account, this last rule enables parliaments to force the Council and the EP to deal with their 
concerns.  
Third, according to Article 8 of the Protocol the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) will have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity by a legislative act, and such action can now also be brought forward by national 
parliaments through their governments. 
Finally, national parliaments also obtained the right to veto the application of the passerelle 
clause (Article 48 para. 7), which covers the transition from unanimity to qualified majority 
or the transition from special to ordinary legislative procedure. National parliaments have to 
be informed at least six months before any decision is adopted and can, individually in this 
case, veto the proposal within this time period. 
 
The Domestic Institutional Context 
The introduction – and implementation - of these new participation rights also had an impact 
on existing institutional provisions within the national context. In particular, national 
parliaments had to implement their own procedures for the handling of the new instruments 
of subsidiarity control. Together with the intensified debate over the role of national 
parliaments in EU politics since the Laeken Declaration and in the context of the Convention 
on the Future of Europe, this has also led to a general overhaul of institutional scrutiny 
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provisions in a number of parliaments (for an overview over institutional reforms triggered 
by the Lisbon Treaty provisions in all chambers of the EU see Hefftler et al. (2015).  
As a result, institutional scrutiny provisions are now more similar, but far from uniform, 
across the EU Member States.3 All national parliaments have set up one or more European 
Affairs Committees (EAC), but great differences still remain regarding the involvement of 
other Standing Committees in EU affairs. Similarly, we can find variation with regard to the 
scrutiny approach. Although the addressee of the scrutiny procedure is, in the end, the 
government, systems differ with regard to whether parliament scrutinises EU documents or 
the government position for the negotiations in the Council or both. While some parliaments 
issue written statements, others transmit their position on European issues to the government 
orally during committee sessions, and some use both procedures. Most importantly, the 
consequences of such statements differ greatly. In some cases, the government is under a 
legal obligation or strong political pressure to follow the position of their parliaments in the 
EU negotiations (mandating procedure). In many other cases, however, parliaments can only 
give their opinion without this having a binding effect on the government. Furthermore, a 
number of parliaments have established so called ‘scrutiny reserves’ aimed at preventing 
government representatives from agreeing to a proposal in the Council while the 
parliamentary scrutiny process is on-going (Auel et al. 2012). Finally, and often overlooked 
in the literature, parliaments also differ with regard to the administrative support in EU 
affairs, and their responses to the administrative challenges arising from the Lisbon Treaty 
have been uneven.  
A number of studies have classified and ranked national parliaments according to their 
institutional strength in EU affairs. Although the rankings differ slightly due to a different 
emphasis on specific institutional provisions, the overall picture is fairly consistent: As the 
latest rankings by Karlas (2012), Winzen (2012) as well as Auel et al. (2015) show, we can 
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identify a group of strong, mainly North European, parliaments including those of Denmark, 
Sweden, and Finland, but also Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. In contrast, rather 
weak parliaments can be found in Southern member states Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal 
and Spain, but also in Belgium and Luxemburg. France, Italy and the UK fall somewhere in 
between. Finally, the new constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe tend to accord a greater 
role for legislatures, and in contrast to their West European counterparts, many of their 
parliaments can – at least with regard to their formal institutional position – be considered as 
rather strong (see also Karlas 2011; Szalay 2005, O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). 
In sum, the institutional capacity of national parliaments has been significantly altered by the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the way in which national systems have adapted to these. 
While in terms of the European level there has been a distinct empowerment of national 
parliaments, their institutional capacity varies significantly across the member states and 
depends to a large extent on domestic arrangements and the specific resources and procedures 
that each individual chamber has available when confronting the challenges of an effective 
involvement in EU affairs.  
 
Motivation: Incentives and driving forces of parliamentary actors 
Institutional provisions and the overall strength of parliaments play an important role in 
understanding how legislatures can respond to the challenges arising from an involvement in 
EU decision-making. At the same time, it is also clear that this is not the whole story, and that 
we also need to study the way in which parliamentary actors respond to these opportunities 
and constraints. Drawing on both rational and sociological neo-institutionalist approaches, the 
following will discuss this motivational dimension in more detail.  
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MPs as Rational Actors 
From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, parliamentarians are rational actors with 
stable preferences who make decisions based on an analysis of costs and benefits. Given that 
parliaments are in fact busy institutions with limited resources, the general expectation is that 
MPs invest these resources, i.e. make use of institutional opportunities, in a way that will 
advance their preferences. Much of the rational choice literature on legislative behaviour 
focuses on career goals of legislators to explain behaviour. From this perspective, legislative 
behaviour can be best understood if legislators are seen as ‘single minded reelection seekers’ 
(Mayhew 1974: 5; see also Cox and McCubbins 1993: 100). Other scholars have criticised 
this purely vote-seeking approach for being too parsimonious and ‘not totally persuasive ... It 
makes little sense to assume that parties value votes for their own sake … votes can only 
plausibly be instrumental goals’ to achieve policy influence and/or the spoils of office (Strøm 
and Mueller 1999: 9). As Budge and Laver (1986) argue, politicians do pursue policy goals, 
either intrinsically, because they sincerely care about the policies in question, or 
instrumentally, as a means for some other goal, for example electoral support. De Swann puts 
it even more forcefully: ‘considerations of policy are foremost in the mind of actors … the 
parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of major government policy’ (De 
Swann 1973: 88).  
On the basis of these considerations, we can assume that the motivation of MPs/PPGs to use 
institutional opportunities, i.e. to engage in parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs depends a) 
on the electoral (and career) benefit that they expect from their activities and b) the 
probability MPs assign to their chance of making a difference, i.e. actually having a policy 
impact (Saalfeld 2003).  
Regarding the former, it can be assumed that public opinion on EU integration can provide a 
strong electoral incentive (Raunio 2005, Saalfeld 2005). In member states where EU issues 
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are more salient and public opinion is generally more critical of EU integration, MPs have 
greater incentives to become active in EU affairs due to the potential electoral impact of EU 
politics. Where, in contrast, European affairs play no role in voting decisions or where the 
permissive consensus prevails, there are no electoral benefits to be gained from investing in 
scrutiny. However, the motivation to engage in scrutiny activities may also vary according to 
the policy area and specific policy issue (Saalfeld 2003): Given the general preference 
structure of MPs, they can be expected to engage more actively in the scrutiny of highly 
salient EU issues, i.e. issues that affect clearly defined (large) groups at the domestic level 
and the domestic public is highly aware of.  
Second, MPs will get involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs if they expect a payoff in terms of 
policy influence (Saalfeld 2005, Winzen 2013). Generally, members of the governing PPGs 
will be more inclined to leave EU politics to their government if they trust the latter to 
represent their mutual policy preferences in the EU negotiations. This trust can be assumed to 
be greatest in the case of single party governments. Although government MPs and ministers 
may not agree on every single issue, we can expect their interests to be fairly similar – unless 
the party is deeply internally divided over EU issues. Divergent preferences - and thus less 
trust - can be expected for coalition governments. Here, coalition partners not only have to 
negotiate compromises, but they also have a stronger incentive to influence and control the 
other coalition partners’ members of government (Martin and Vanberg 2004). Trust can 
finally be considered lowest in the case of minority governments, where the government 
cannot rely on stable support in parliament but has to negotiate majorities for its policies.  
While rationalist approaches, and especially agency theory, have been the dominant way to 
analyse parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, they are also often criticised for their lack 
of any ‘discernible relation to the actual or possible behaviour of flesh-and-blood human 
beings’ (Simon 1976: xxvii). In particular, it has been argued that a rationalist approach is ill 
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suited to explain parliamentary behaviour as it cannot account for what has to be ‘irrational’ 
behaviour in a strategic sense (Rozenberg 2012): In many parliaments, MPs spend several 
hours per week scrutinizing EU documents, presenting parliamentary reports and drafting 
resolutions despite knowing that their activities will gain little attention from voters and have 
a limited impact on policy. Thus, it can be argued that MPs need motivations or incentives 
that go beyond vote or policy seeking. According to Searing (1994: 1253), the ‘difficulty with 
economic rational choice models is that their overly cognitive assumptions about self-interest 
tend to obscure and dismiss the wide variety of desires that shape and reshape our goals - and 
also our judgments about which courses of action will be most effective [or appropriate, the 
authors] for satisfying these goals’.  
The following will therefore discuss alternative approaches to explaining parliamentary 
behaviour. Given the wide variety of approaches that rely on culture, beliefs, ideas and norms 
to explain behaviour, the following will not provide an in-depth discussion of the broad 
literature. Rather, the short overview will highlight some possibilities to conceptualise March 
and Olsen’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
 
The Role of Norms and Values 
From a sociological institutionalism perspective, institutions do not simply provide 
opportunities or constraints for rational actors. Rather, institutions ‘mould their own 
participants, and supply systems of meaning for their participants in politics’ (Peters 1999: 
26). Individuals do make conscious choices, but these choices are not purely guided by a 
personal pay-off in terms of exogenous preferences, but rather remain within the parameters 
established by the dominant institutional values and norms (Peters 1999: 29). One way to 
conceptualise the ‘logic of appropriateness’ is parliamentary culture. Political culture has 
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been described as 'a short-hand expression for a "mind set" which has the effect of limiting 
attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviours, problems, and solutions which 
are logically possible' (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 128). Therefore, the question of whether and 
how parliamentarians engage in scrutiny activities touches upon the question of how the 
process of European integration and its challenges to national parliaments affects these 
cultural factors, and how, in turn, scrutiny in EU politics is influenced by general 
parliamentary traditions and political culture. Whether a more cooperative or a more 
confrontational culture dominates the parliamentary system, for example, has an impact on 
legislative behaviour and the way parliamentary control and scrutiny of the executive is 
exercised. As Sprungk (2003) has argued, a co-operative relationship between parliament and 
the government may hamper intensive parliamentary control: Public confrontation with the 
government, especially through a more aggressive use of scrutiny rights and or by exerting 
pressure on the government to comply with parliamentary policy preferences, may not be 
considered appropriate. In addition, Sprungk argues that the general attitude of MPs towards 
European integration may impact their motivation to engage in scrutiny activity. A party 
favourable of European integration may view parliamentary scrutiny as a factor impeding 
smooth European policy making and thus as inappropriate. Such views were readily visible in 
the plenary debates over the implementation of parliamentary participation rights in the 
German Bundestag following the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
Lisbon Treaty (Auberger and Lamping 2009). 
Similarly, MPs beliefs about the legitimacy of procedures and institutions or their assessment 
of the relative importance of parliamentary functions can have an impact on the their 
motivation to become involved in EU affairs. A study by Weßels (2005), for example, reveals 
the interrelation between parliamentary views about the relative importance of parliamentary 
functions and their attitudes towards how democratic legitimacy is to be achieved in the EU, 
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on the one hand, and their views on the role national parliaments should play in EU politics, 
on the other hand. The findings show, for example, ‘that working parliaments – those where 
the governance function is obviously dominant – regard themselves as powerful enough to 
play the European policy game in direct contact with the government, informal coordination 
and bargaining. … Parliaments that serve more as houses of deliberation, [in contrast, the 
authors] use articulation and voice as the way to react to European policy-making’ (Weßels 
2005: 463f.). The study’s results suggest that different parliamentary norms and beliefs will 
have an impact not only on the general motivation of MPs to engage in scrutiny, but also, for 
example, on the extent to which they feel the need to become directly involved in the policy 
process at the EU level, for example through new instruments such as the Early Warning 
Mechanism or the Political Dialogue.  
Finally, role theory provides a means of incorporating values and beliefs and thus the logic of 
appropriateness. While our research is not directly concerned with parliamentary roles in EU 
politics, the notion of ‘parliamentary role’4 is nonetheless helpful as ‘roles are not merely 
individual beliefs and tastes, but articulate collective norms and values, which might have 
consequences for MPs’ behaviour inside and outside the parliamentary chamber’ (Blomgren 
and Rozenberg 2012b: 211). This emphasis on both shared and individual norms, 
expectations, ideas or beliefs, enable us to analyse and explain the motivation behind specific 
patterns of behaviour.  
In his influential motivational approach to parliamentary roles, Searing (1994, 1991) 
famously distinguished between rules and reasons as two drivers for the selection of roles. 
The former links legislative behaviour to the expectations generated by institutional rules and 
formal positions of MPs. Thus, the assumption is that general expectations and norms 
connected to specific parliamentary offices or, more generally, to being a member of the 
opposition or the governing PPGs will have a – fairly predictable – impact on behavioural 
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patterns. At the same time, parliamentary positions leave – depending on the precise office – 
more or less leeway to choose between different parliamentary activities MPs may focus on. 
The latter is driven by preferences that concern both, more strategic goals such as career 
advancement, and more emotional goals such as providing good constituency service. 
Rozenberg (2012), for example, shows that the chairmen of the European affairs Committees 
in the House of Commons and the French Assemblée Nationale adopt distinct parliamentary 
roles, such as ‘Chair’, ‘Clubman’, ‘Inquisitor and ‘the One who rubs shoulders with the Great 
and Powerful’. These roles, and the underlying motives for adopting them, helps understand 
the specific pattern of activity each committee developed, be it special attention to the 
detailed scrutiny of EU documents, an emphasis on hearings with ministers or a focus on 
informal participation to decision making. Such preferences are also not purely endogenous 
and completely shaped by the institutional environment (Searing 1994). MPs may enter 
parliament with given preferences yet these preferences may change and adapt to the 
situation as well as parliamentary institutions and norms (Searing 1994: 483). Preferences 
and the behaviour to pursue them are constructed within, but not determined by, the given 
organisation.  
To sum up, we argue that attention to both institutional and actor-centred factors is required 
to explain how national parliaments operate in the EU, and crucial to understanding the 
diversity in their involvement in EU policy making and their responses to the new 
opportunities arising from the Lisbon Treaty. Answers to questions such as ‘How can we 
explain the variation in the level and type of engagement with EU politics across national 
parliaments?’ or ‘Why are some chambers much more active than others in making use of the 
new powers?’ can only be conclusively answered by looking into both capacity and 
motivation as possible explanatory factors. This has been the approach underlying the 
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empirical research that has been conducted in the context of the OPAL project and which is 
presented in the contributions to this volume. 
 
The Performance of Parliaments in the European Union 
The empirical research being presented in the contributions to this volume demonstrates how 
multi-faceted the role of national parliaments has become. The recent phase of European 
integration, and in particular the ‘double-whammy’ of the Lisbon reforms and the eurozone 
crisis, have created an entirely new set of opportunities and challenges to which parliaments 
had to respond. The research shows that in many cases parliaments have reacted to these 
changes but it also shows that these changes are far from uniform and that generalisation 
across the universe of legislatures in the EU remains highly problematic. 
A first observation concerns what one might call the internal impact of Europe: the way in 
which legislatures have adapted their working mechanisms, procedures, staffing levels, and 
committee structures to the demands of a more prominent EU. One aspect here is the 
changing relationship between, on the one hand, elected MPs and, on the other hand, clerks in 
committee secretariats and other civil servants working as advisors and technical experts in 
parliamentary administrations. As Anna-Lena Högenauer and Christine Neuhold show in 
their contribution, MPs have, for a variety of reasons, become increasingly dependent on 
administrative support: the technical expertise required to deal with the growing number of 
incoming EU dossiers, the dynamic of increasing horizontal cooperation among parliaments 
in the EU, and the related practice of having parliamentary representative posted in Brussels. 
The latter, in particular, have developed an important role in providing informal access to 
information about developments within the various chambers, thus ‘short-circuiting’ the 
coordination of parliamentary action in the context of the EWS. However, the authors also 
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point out that across the EU significant variation remains in the roles that parliamentary 
officials carry out and that even though the majority of chambers now employ administrators 
possessing an agenda-shaping role, this remains in the service of, rather than as a replacement 
of, the primacy of political decision-making.  
This ties in with the analysis conducted by Alexander Strelkov who argues that in the relative 
balance of ‘internal power’, parliamentary party groups maintain the upper hand vis-à-vis 
other parliamentary actors (such as committees and administrators), even if this – privileging 
party political preferences over technical expertise – leads to a somewhat ’shallow’ scrutiny 
of EU legislation. A further internal dimension of adaption to Europe is the growing 
‘mainstreaming’ of EU affairs (Gattermann, Högenauer and Huff, 2013) – the fact that the 
scrutiny of EU affairs is increasingly carried out beyond designated European Affairs 
Committees, as other sectoral committees engage with EU matters that pertain to their 
portfolio.  
These internal developments are remarkable and significant, even if it remains difficult to 
link their incidence to the standard categories of parliamentary strength or institutional 
capacity. The contribution by Katrin Auel, Olivier Rozenberg and Angela Tacea tackles this 
question head-on, presenting the data of a large, quantitative analysis testing a number of 
hypotheses on the link between parliamentary activity and possible explanatory variables 
based on institutional capacities as well as political motivation. They conclude that in order to 
understand the driving forces of parliamentary activity it is essential to go beyond the idea of 
institutional strength and develop more sophisticated models looking at the likely 
effectiveness of instruments at the disposal of legislatures, and to consider the actual activity 
– resolutions, reasoned opinions, committee meetings or plenary debates – in more depth. 
The data shows that strong parliaments are not invariably the most active, and that beyond 
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institutional capacity motivational factors have significance in explaining parliamentary 
activity.  
Katjana Gattermann and Claudia Hefftler, in their more specific analysis of the driving forces 
behind the incidence of issuing reasoned opinions in the context of the EWS, come to a 
similar conclusion: having tested for a range of possible explanatory factors, their paper 
demonstrates that MPs are more likely to vote for a reason opinion if certain conditions (party 
political contestation, the salience and urgency of EU draft legislation and an adverse macro-
economic context). This is further evidence that one must go beyond the formal powers and 
institutional capacity of chambers in order to understand what drives their engagement with 
the EU level.  
Beyond the narrow confines of the EWS, parliaments have been challenged by the eurozone 
crisis, be it in terms of voting on proposed bail-out packages or on the conditionality that has 
come with these packages for the programme countries. The widespread view has been that 
the technocratic governance and intergovernmental nature of the crisis-management carried 
with it the risk of further ‘de-parliamentarisation’ – an important question explored by Katrin 
Auel and Oliver Höing in their contribution to this volume. Again the finding here is that 
there is significant variation in the way in which legislatures have responded to the impact 
from the European level. Unsurprisingly, parliaments in eurozone member states have been 
more active than those outside, but even within the eurozone certain differences have been 
identified by the authors: debtor countries have seen much less parliamentary activity than 
creditor countries, and stronger parliaments have managed to cope better with the increasing 
demands. There is thus no blanket weakening of legislatures due to the intergovernmental 
nature of crisis-management, but rather the exacerbation of existing strengths and 
weaknesses. Indeed, some legislatures, such as the German Bundestag, have been able to 
expand their powers in these circumstances. 
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Another area of EU policy-making which has seen a greater degree of engagement by 
national parliament in recent years has been foreign and security policy, and in her 
contribution, Ariella Huff provides an in-depth analysis of the way in which parliaments have 
performed in this area. Her study adds to the body of evidence that demonstrates that formal 
powers are not the only, and perhaps not even the main, guide to parliamentary activity. Huff 
shows that the motivations of MPs matter a great deal when it comes to the parliamentary 
scrutiny of CFSP. Here the normative frame within which MPs perceive their role with 
regard to foreign policy, as well as the coherence – or lack of it – in party political positions 
on European integration have great influence on parliamentary activity: internal divisions 
among parties or coalitions are seen as a reason why their interest in parliamentary debates, 
and hence the scrutiny of EU foreign policy, is limited. 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the contributions to this volume validate the choice in favour of a neo-
institutionalist framework that is sensitive to the relevance of both institutional capacity and 
motivational factors. Much of the past literature on national parliaments has focused on 
formal powers and defined parliamentary strength in terms of the formal rules and 
constitutional arrangements. While these are important dimensions, the articles in this volume 
make clear that the situation is more complex: what matters is not only what powers a 
legislature has in terms of scrutinising the national executive, or the EU decision-making 
process, but whether MPs are willing and able to make effective use of these. Access to 
resources – support staff, expertise, time – as well as the political incentives to engage with 
EU matters are relevant, and in some cases more so than the formal powers themselves. 
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The image of national parliaments and their activity in the European Union that emerges from 
these studies is varied, and does not lend itself to easy generalisation. Parliaments have not 
emerged from the Lisbon Treaty reforms as being empowered and fully-engaged with the 
European project. There remains much scepticism, ambivalence and even ignorance within 
national legislatures about developments at the European level. Some of this can be put down 
to limited capacities, with many MPs either lacking the time to devote the attention required 
to EU legislation, or else making a calculated decision to focus on higher-profile domestic 
issues. Inevitably, parliamentary activity on European affairs remains selective, with issue 
salience and party politics important intervening variables in explaining how (in)active a 
particular chamber is with regard to Europe.  
At the same time, it has to be recognised that there are certain dynamics at play which have 
fundamentally transformed the situation compared to only a few years ago. The first of these 
is a discursive change which has seen national parliaments widely regarded as a key part in 
any future reform of democratic procedures of the European Union – a discourse that 
includes contributions from both Eurosceptics wanting to ‘repatriate’ powers from the 
European level, and from advocates of further integration seeking engagement with national 
parliaments as a way of strengthening the EU’s legitimacy. Even though some of these 
expectations are out of tune with the more modest reality in current practice – as the 
following contributions also demonstrate – this has not stopped this discourse from 
developing along these lines in the post-Lisbon era (Groen and Christiansen, 2015). 
A second dynamics has been that of inter-parliamentary cooperation, building on but moving 
beyond the traditional and highly formalised mechanisms such as COSAC or the Conference 
of Speakers. While such long-standing institutions have been upgraded in the context of the 
Early Warning Mechanism, informal relations between parliaments have become more 
widespread and more important. This includes both collaborations between elected members 
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and between parliamentary officials and clerks, be it to facilitate information exchanges or 
the coordination of activities in the context of the EWS. To some extent, such exchanges 
between chambers in different member states is driven by the very divergence that has been 
alluded to above: those from parliaments in the ‘avant-garde’, with greater desire and/or 
resources to make their voice heard at the European level, are looking for the support from 
others in order to achieve a greater impact, or are being approached for access to information 
or expertise.  
A related development concerns the vertical relations between national parliaments and the 
EP. Also these have become increasingly formalised, both inside the institutions – the EP 
now has not one but two Vice-Presidents for Relations with National Parliaments – and 
through the creation of new bodies bringing together deputies from the national and the 
European level such as the Art.13 Conference in the area of economic governance or the 
Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP. However, while these enhanced relations between 
national and European level is recognition of the importance of cooperation between 
legislatures – somewhat belatedly in view of decades of administrative ‘fusion’ on the 
executive side (Wessels 1997) – it has also made the potential for disagreements between the 
EP and national parliaments more apparent (Cooper, 2014). Far from being natural allies, the 
EP and national chambers are also competitors in the market-place for the provision of 
democratic legitimacy and rivals in the search for voters’ attention. 
Future reform of the European Union is likely to include an agenda for further structural 
improvements concerning the legitimacy of decision-making, in particular regarding the area 
of fiscal stability and economic governance. It is here that institutional solutions to some of 
the persisting dilemmas facing the Union will have to be found – maintaining decisional 
efficiency while ensuring democratic legitimacy and transparency. The differentiated nature 
of economic governance, with more far-reaching decision-making now only affecting the 
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member states of the eurozone, creates increasing tensions for the existing institutional 
arrangements, raising questions whether EU institutions can continue to serve the eurozone, 
or whether new bodies – either with mixed national-European membership or sub-committee 
of the EP – need to be set up for the scrutiny of decision-making in this particular area. It is 
with a view to this reform agenda that the EP and advocates of greater powers for national 
parliaments already find themselves on opposite sides of the debate (Deubner 2013). 
The involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs has developed significantly since the 
Lisbon Treaty and the eurozone crisis brought both new opportunities and new challenges. It 
certainly has come a long way since questions were raised about them being ‘victims’ 
(O’Brennan and Raunio 2007), ‘losers’ or ‘late-comers’ (Maurer and Wessels 2001). A 
sizeable number of chambers have chosen to engage with EU affairs as a matter of course, 
have been adapting their internal procedures and institutional capacity, and are linking up 
with other parliaments on a regular basis. However, the degree of parliamentary activism 
remains patchy, and it would be wrong to talk of a generalised empowerment of national 
parliaments, either vis-à-vis the national executives or the European institutions. 
The research presented in this volume sheds some light both on the patterns of variation and 
on their causes. As such, it advances our knowledge of this complex domain and provides 
new insights into the possibilities for, and the limitations of, national parliaments to scrutinise 
and influence EU decision-making in the post-Lisbon era. The findings presented in the 
articles of this issue demonstrate the importance of focusing on both institutional and 
motivational factors in the research on national parliaments, and to work with both qualitative 
and quantitative methods in doing so. 
At a time when national parliaments have arrived in ‘Europe’ and are there to stay, the 
publication of this research will be valuable in gaining a better understanding of the 
difference that national parliaments can make, under what conditions and at what price. 
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Certain patterns have been identified which help us making sense of the diverse nature of this 
interaction between national and European actors, between legislatures and executives and 
between elected politicians and civil servants. 
This area remains an aspect of European integration that is bound to develop further, with the 
search for ways of improving the legitimacy of EU decision-making continuing, not least in 
the face of the results of the 2014 European elections. High hopes are attached to the role that 
may be played by national parliaments in this regard, and in this context the contributions to 
this volume not only advance the scientific discussion, but will also be valuable in the context 





1 For excellent overviews see Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008, Raunio 2009, Winzen 2010 and Rozenberg and 
Hefftler 2015.  
2 For details about this project, see http://www.opal-europe.org. Contributors draw on both qualitative and 
quantitative data. In the context of the OPAL project, several large-scale surveys were conducted and unique 
empirical databases developed. Most important among these are: a) a qualitative database on institutional 
provisions both in domestic and European Affairs with contributions from national experts on all 28 
parliamentary systems in the EU (including Croatia; for excerpts see www.opal-europe.org), and b) a 
quantitative data collection of parliamentary activities between 2010 and 2012 in all 40 national chambers 
across the EU. In addition, members of OPAL have collected quantitative and in-depth qualitative data on a 
broad range of national parliaments, specific institutional capacities and parliamentary activities.  
3 A comprehensive overview over the scrutiny provisions in all national parliaments can be found in Hefftler et 
al. 2015.  
4 For an extensive literature overview see Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012a. 
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